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DOUBLE FAULT: HOW THE NCAA’S NO-AGENT
RULE SERVES LEGAL AND POLICY ERRORS INTO
THE COURTS OF TENNIS
Christopher M. Hartley
I. INTRODUCTION
From the courts of law to the courts of policy, collegiate
tennis is hamstrung by the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s (NCAA) no-agent rule.1 The casual college or
professional tennis fan may not be aware of the problem as the
visible effects of the rule tend to make it seem like it is more of
an individual player’s problem rather than a major concern for
NCAA member schools. After all, it is the individual tennis
player who loses a collegiate athletic opportunity if they violate
the no-agent rule.2
However, the hidden effects of the rule can also hinder
college and university athletic departments in the form of
potential losses of top-prospect student-athletes as well as
squandered recruiting efforts. The rule may also dissuade
prospective collegiate tennis players from taking advantage of
valuable career talent-management resources, resulting in a
mutually unfavorable situation for the athletes, schools, and
tennis profession. As long as college remains an attractive option


Assistant Professor, Department of Law, United States Military Academy, West
Point. The author is an active duty Army Judge Advocate. The views expressed here are the
author’s personal views and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense,
the United States Army, the United States Military Academy, or any other department or
agency of the United States Government.
1. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2018-2019 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.3.1, at 71 (2018), [https://perma.cc/X7MZ-SD6T] [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL ].
The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s name, purpose, and fundamental policy are
listed on page one of the NCAA Manual.
2. See id.
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for tennis players considering a professional career, this issue will
remain relevant for all parties involved.3
While the policy shortcomings of the NCAA’s no-agent rule
are easier to articulate than the legal ones, the rule is not
impervious to legal challenge. Recent court cases suggest the
road leading to successful challenges of the rule is at least
becoming paved.4 Courts are entertaining criticism of the rule
from prospective collegiate athletes who have fallen victim to it.5
Scholarly articles critical of the rule have catalyzed policy
adjustments.6 To be sure, the rumblings of discontent portend
more changes in the future.
To date, however, the NCAA’s no-agent rule still exists, and
the NCAA has not exempted any one sport from the rule.7 If the
call for complete abandonment of the rule has never been made,
this Article engages that discussion and serves the proposal into
the court of tennis. Given the rule’s questionable policy effects
on the sport of tennis, as well as the potential for increased legal
and policy challenges as long as the rule exists, this Article calls
for the outright removal of the NCAA’s no-agent rule for
prospective collegiate tennis players.
II. IN PURSUIT OF AMATEURISM: NCAA RULES
FACE SCRUTINY
As the regulating body for many university and college
athletic teams, the NCAA champions as one of its commitments
the standard of “maintaining a line of demarcation between
student-athletes who participate in the Collegiate Model and
3. See Nina Pantic, College Has Helped Shape the Careers and Lives of Many Pro
Players, Tᴇɴɴɪs.ᴄᴏᴍ, (Oct. 25, 2017), [https://perma.cc/XP64-U39G].
4. See, e.g., Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 626 (Colo. App. 2004); Oliver v. NCAA,
920 N.E. 2d 203, 213-14 (Ohio C.P. Erie Cnty. 2009).
5. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1087 (7th Cir. 1992); Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at
213-14.
6. See, e.g., J. Winston Busby, Playing for Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must Require
a Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of Student-Athletes, 42 Cᴜᴍʙ. L. Rᴇᴠ.
135, 149, 171-74 (2012); T. Matthew Lockhart, Oliver v. NCAA: Throwing a Contractual
Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil of Amateurism,” 35 U. Dᴀʏᴛᴏɴ L. Rᴇᴠ. 175, 181, 188, 19798 (2010); Matthew Stross, The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring Amateurism, 2 Mɪss.
Sᴘᴏʀᴛs L. Rᴇᴠ. 167, 172-73, 189 (2013).
7. See NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2019-2020 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.3.1, at 71 (2019), [https://perma.cc/22WL-ZMFT] [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL,
2019-2020].
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athletes competing in the professional model.”8 Indeed, many
sports fans choose to attend or watch intercollegiate athletics
because collegiate athletes, who are not paid for their
contributions to the university, are playing for the “love of the
game” thus resulting in a more uncorrupted form of competition
than their sports’ professional counterparts.9 For schools
participating in Division I athletics, the NCAA’s “rulebook” is
the NCAA Division I Manual (the Manual), which includes its
constitution and bylaws.10 Much of the Manual’s contents are
focused on the mission of preserving amateurism in collegiate
athletics.11
However, some NCAA rules that are focused on maintaining
that line of demarcation have been criticized in recent sports law
and law review articles.12 Often, critiques point out the
inconsistencies when certain rules are applied to aspiring
collegiate athletes who are considering the prospect of a
professional athletic career in lieu of college.13 These arguments
include claims that the interests of amateurism are not served by
the rules or that the rules put the student-athletes in an unfair
position because the student is not personally involved in an
alleged rule infraction.14 Frequently, these discussions center
around the NCAA’s no-agent rule, which forecloses a studentathlete’s eligibility to compete at the intercollegiate level if they
have ever received the services of an agent.15
This Article further develops the critiques of the NCAA noagent rule and examines the issue through the lens of collegiate
and professional tennis. Tennis is uniquely situated in this debate
because it is arguably the NCAA sport in which its college-bound
athletes flirt with the prospect of “going pro” at an earlier age than
athletes in other NCAA sports.16 Whether a football or basketball
8. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at xii.
9. See Saul Pink, Why College Football Players Shouldn’t Get Paid, INT’L Dᴀᴛᴇʟɪɴᴇ
(Dec. 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/JP4H-C73R].
10. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at iii-v, 8.
11. See id. at xii.
12. See Busby, supra note 6, at 141, 148-49; Stross, supra note 6, at 172-73, 178.
13. See Lockhart, supra note 6; Stross, supra note 6, at 169, 171, 180-81.
14. See Busby, supra note 6; Stross, supra note 6, at 173, 177-78, 184.
15. See Busby, supra note 6, at 148-49; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 181; Stross, supra
note 6.
16. See, e.g., Ben Rothenberg, Path to Pros Rarely Crosses Campus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
10, 2013, at D6 [hereinafter Rothenberg, Path to Pros]; Ben Rothenberg, Some Chafe at
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player’s skills will give them a solid chance to compete in the
professional ranks is often not fully realized until they enter
collegiate athletic competition. For baseball, the process starts
earlier, with many high school players discovering they have
professional potential during their high school years such that a
decision to forego a collegiate baseball career and directly enter
professional baseball’s minor leagues is a relatively common
occurrence.17
In tennis, that professional aspiration and preparation
process also starts earlier than in many other sports that field
teams in intercollegiate competition.18 Tennis players desiring to
play at the elite collegiate level have been known to start to
playing tennis as early as the age of three, compete in junior
tournaments as early as thirteen, and compete in professional
tournaments (where cash prizes are awarded) as early as
fourteen.19 The key part about the previous sentence is that it
pertains to aspiring collegiate tennis players. But it could have
just as easily referred to aspiring professional tennis players. That
is because both sets of players engage in the exact same things at
the same young age. In addition to the previously mentioned
Rules Meant to Protect Youngest Girls, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2017, at D2; Jim Brockman,
Chang Captures Battle of Sophies, HERALD-TRIBUNE (May 23, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/WD4G-DDTW].
17. See Probability of Playing College and Professional Baseball, HIGH SCH.
BASEBALL WEB, [https://perma.cc/GYZ7-UQKH] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019), for statistics
revealing that while going from high school baseball directly to the professional ranks is still
a slim probability, it is more likely to happen than in other sports, such as basketball and
football. See also Stross, supra note 6, at 183-84 (explaining how baseball’s minor league
system that many aspiring professionals enter demands a different standard of amateurism
than other sports).
18. See Rothenberg, Path to Pros, supra note 16. Part of this dynamic is fueled by the
fact that tennis is largely an individual sport, whereas collegiate tennis is one of the few
places where tennis is played both as an individual sport and a team competition.
19. See, e.g., INT’L TENNIS FED’N, 2019 ITF WORLD TENNIS TOUR JUNIORS REGS. 8283 (2019), [https://perma.cc/Y63Z-US7D]; INT’L TENNIS FED’N, 2019 MEN’S & WOMEN’S
ITF WORLD TENNIS TOUR REGS. 138-39 (2019), [https://perma.cc/6PH2-NP3K]
[hereinafter 2019 ITF MEN’S & WOMEN’S REGULATIONS]; ATP, THE 2019 ATP OFFICIAL
RULEBOOK 91 (2019), [https://perma.cc/7TH7-878G] (listing the rules and regulations of the
Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP)); WOMEN’S TENNIS ASS’N, 2019 WTA OFFICIAL
RULEBOOK 253-56 (2019), [https://perma.cc/569Q-J7MU] (listing the Women’s Tennis
Association’s (WTA) rules). To be eligible to compete in the ITF World Tennis Tour Juniors
competition, per ITF’s regulations, players must be between the ages of thirteen and
eighteen. Players can earn ranking points but are not eligible to win cash prizes in junior
tournaments. ITF World Tour, ATP, and WTA, all require players to be at least fourteen
years old. It is at this level of tournament play that players are eligible to win cash prizes.
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activities, both types of tennis players hire personal coaches,
enroll in and train at elite tennis academies, and seek specialized
schooling at a very young age in order to facilitate the many oncourt hours required just to be competitive in both the collegiate
and professional domains.20
For both classes of young athletes, the factors that weigh into
the decision of whether one’s tennis career might evolve into a
full-time profession are present during these formative years.
While the young tennis player does not have to decide to go pro
by a certain age, preparations must start early if that option is to
remain on the table.21 One of the common items of preparation
for the more talented young tennis players is to hire an agent: an
action which, under current NCAA rules, forecloses any prospect
of eventually competing in intercollegiate tennis if the
professional career fails to materialize.22 To be sure, players that
reach the elite professional ranks usually display the promise that
would inspire hiring an agent at a very young age.23
This Article proposes a change to the NCAA no-agent rule
with respect to tennis. It urges the NCAA to abandon the noagent rule for tennis players who have yet to matriculate into a
college or university, but to continue applying the rule to athletes
currently competing in NCAA athletics.
To provide valuable perspective, Part III of this Article
describes the environment of lower-level professional tennis
tournaments in which both high school and collegiate players
participate. Further illustrating this process and showcasing the
effect of the no-agent rule, Part IV introduces the story of two
tennis players whose collegiate tennis aspirations were foreclosed
20. See Rothenberg, Path to Pros, supra note 16 (quoting Nicole Gibbs, who describes
the minimal differences between the quality of play in college and professional tennis); see
also Kamakshi Tandon, More to Rafa Than Meets the Eye, ESPN (Aug. 26, 2011),
[https://perma.cc/Y27L-BR5W] (noting that Rafael Nadal, now a highly successful
professional tennis player, attended a sports boarding school at a young age).
21. See generally U.S. Tennis Ass’n, The Progressive Development of a High
Performance Player, UTSA: PLAYER DEV., [https://perma.cc/ES2Q-J8TG] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019); Rothenberg, Path to Pros, supra note 16.
22. See Al Roth, Junior Tennis Players: Turn Pro or Go to College?, MKT. DESIGN
(Sept. 30, 2010), [https://perma.cc/8A62-597S] (discussing the agent feeding frenzy at junior
tennis tournaments). The article also explains how European players do not enjoy collegiate
rule structure to help protect them from that frenzy. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note
1.
23. See Roth, supra note 22.
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by the rule. Part V sets up the legal and policy questions to be
addressed. Part VI outlines the NCAA rules applicable to tennis
players who have earned money at tournaments and/or hired an
agent. Part VII highlights several critiques of the no-agent rule
set forth by various law journals. Part VIII explores the general
contract law issues at play when a prospective professional tennis
player hires an agent. Part IX highlights several court decisions
that address the no-agent and other NCAA eligibility rules. Part
X then discusses the follow-on policy problems resulting from the
contract law conundrum created by the no-agent rule and whether
the rule serves its intended purpose. Finally, part XI proposes
changes to the NCAA’s no-agent rule with respect to the sport of
tennis.
III. THE TENNIS “MINOR LEAGUES”
Charlottesville, Virginia, is just one of many small cities
across the United States that hosts professional tennis
tournaments.24 The city hosts a men’s tournament in October and
a women’s event in April.25 These tournaments are part of a
“circuit” of tournaments that occur across the United States and
around the world literally twelve months out of the year.26 The
United States Tennis Association (USTA) regulates the events
that occur in the United States, known as the “Pro-Circuit,”27
while the International Tennis Federation (ITF) sanctions all such
tournaments held around the world.28 Worldwide, there can be as
many as ten or more of these tournaments occurring the same

24. See generally 2019 USTA Men’s Competitive Pathway Calendar, UTSA
[https://perma.cc/ACJ7-JS6C] (last updated June 21, 2019) [hereinafter UTSA, 2019 Men’s
Calendar] (the cities hosting men’s professional tournaments in 2019 includes Norman,
Oklahoma, and Champaign, Illinois); 2019 USTA Women’s Competitive Pathway Calendar,
UTSA [https://perma.cc/6Q6N-8882] (last updated Sept. 26, 2019) [hereinafter UTSA, 2019
Women’s Calendar] (the cities hosting women’s professional tournaments in 2019 includes
Midland, Michigan and Pelham, Alabama).
25. See UTSA, 2019 Men’s Calendar, supra note 24, and UTSA, 2019 Women’s
Calendar, supra note 24, for the complete UTSA Pro Circuit men’s and women’s schedules.
26. U.S. TENNIS ASS’N, 2019 USTA PRO CIRCUIT PROGRAM 1, 7 (2019),
[https://perma.cc/A7TW-PNRM] [hereinafter UTSA PROGRAM ].
27. Id. at 7.
28. For the full listings of the International Tennis Federation’s world-wide schedules
and results, see INT’L TENNIS FED’N, [https://perma.cc/SB5G-E3L7] (last visited Sept. 29,
2019).
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week.29 These are the “minor leagues” of professional tennis. The
level of the tournament is influenced by the prize money
available, and the tournaments field players who generally have
world rankings of 100 through 1,000 and beyond.30
While attending a tournament like the one in Charlottesville
as a spectator, several things stand out. First, there are rarely any
crowds and typically only a handful of fellow spectators.31
Indeed, some tennis matches go on without anyone courtside
watching save for the occasional coach and the player’s host
family.32 Many of the players stay with these host families who
are members of the tournament’s tennis facility venue. 33 The
tennis club facility hosting the tournament asks for volunteers
amongst its members to house the players while they participate
in the tournament as a lodging cost-saving measure to the
players.34
The hallways of the indoor sections of the tennis facility are
lined with players sitting on any available seats or the floor, with
their tennis gear by their side, as they await their next match or
practice session.35 All the while, the chatter between the players
often entails asking each other whether they will participate in the
following week’s tournament, often a few states away, how they
plan to travel to that tournament, and if they are amenable to
sharing a ride.36 Frugality is the watchword; there are no fancy
cars, and players often avoid staying at local hotels because it is
simply too expensive.37 Make no mistake, this is an expensive
endeavor. However, the money that is spent by the players goes
to ensuring they have good equipment (their racquets), paying for
coaches, funding their travel to the various tournaments, as well
29. Id.
30. See generally INT’L TENNIS FED’N, Rankings List, ITF, [https://perma.cc/G37ADHQW] (last updated Sept. 23, 2019).
31. David Waldstein, The Lonely Road to Tennis Glory, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2017, at
D1 [hereinafter Waldstein, The Lonely Road].
32. See id.; see also David Waldstein, Tennis’s Lowest Pro Rung Offers Little Reward,
but Thousands Play On, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2017, at SP1 [hereinafter Waldstein,
Thousands Play On]. The author of the present article supplements the cited descriptions of
professional tennis tournaments with some of his own personal observations.
33. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
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as paying for food—more expensive than meets the eye as these
are diets of elite athletes who engage in some form of fitness or
tennis training many hours a day.38
The purpose of this description is to paint a clearer, and often
unseen, picture of the lives of most professional tennis players.
This is not the world of elite players like Roger Federer or Serena
Williams, though Roger and Serena recognizably started their
careers in similar venues.39 Further, this is probably not what the
casual tennis fan envisions a tennis tournament would look like;
all casual fans have seen is the television produced glitz and
glamor of one of tennis’s four “grand slams” (tennis lexicon for
one of the four largest “major tournaments” in the world:
Wimbledon, Roland Garros (French Open), Australian Open, and
U.S. Open).40 Those who only tune in to the semifinals or finals
of a major tournament like Wimbledon or the U.S. Open will
recognize few, if any, of the names of players at these Pro Circuit
tournaments. The difference between a typical tennis tournament
at the Pro Circuit level and one of the grand slams is an off-thechart magnitude, not just in terms of prize money involved.41 One
who attends the U.S. Open after attending only Pro Circuit events
will be overwhelmed at the Open’s size, while one who has only
attended grand slam events and decides to check out a Pro Circuit
tournament will wonder if they are at an actual tennis tournament
at all.42
Some of the players participating in Pro Circuit tournaments
are chipping their way up the world rankings and some are sliding
38. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31; see also ASS’N PRESS, Slams Pay
Bills for Rank-and-File Players, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2016, at SP10; Doree Lewak, These
U.S. Open Tennis Pros Are Pretty Much Broke, N.Y. POST (Aug. 26, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/D6PC-RWEB].
39. See generally History, ROGER FEDERER, [https://perma.cc/ED4M-Q58M] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019) (listing a year-by-year history of Roger Federer’s career); Serena
Williams, WTA, [https://perma.cc/7DNB-T33R] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (outlining
Serena Williams’s career).
40. Grand Slam Overview, ITFTENNIS, [https://perma.cc/KF5D-BTMH] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019).
41. Compare 2019 U.S. Open Prize Money, US OPEN, [https://perma.cc/DP9E-9HSQ]
(the available prize money for men’s and women’s singles in the 2019 U.S. Open totaled
$42,860,000), with UTSA PROGRAM, supra note 26, at 46-47 (listing the prize money
awarded in USTA Pro Circuit events for 2018, ranging from $25,000 to $100,000).
42. See 2019 U.S. Open Sets All-Time Attendance Record, US OPEN,
[https://perma.cc/3RHQ-AF6L] (Sept. 8, 2019) (2019 U.S. Open attendance totaled
853,227); see also Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
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down.43 A few will make a meteoric rise to the elite rankings of
world tennis. Some are mid-teens who are training at elite tennis
academies. 44 Others are collegiate players taking the opportunity
to see how they measure up against the rising professionals. 45
Still, others may have been competitive enough to play on the big
stage at one point in their careers, but this is the level at which
they are able to compete: just playing for the love of the game.46
Collegiate players test the waters at these tournaments to see if
they want to pursue a professional career upon graduation.47 Precollegiate players (juniors) often find themselves deciding
whether to forgo college and immediately pursue the professional
path.
With all the differences between the players who participate
in these lower-level tournaments, there is one common
denominator: while playing in these tournaments, the players
generally are not making more money than they are spending on
the sport, given the high costs of travel and the relatively meager
tournament prize money available at this level.48 Of course, that
is assuming the player advances far enough in any given
tournament to see a measurable fraction of that tournament’s total
“purse” of prize money.49
The bottom line is, this is the often unseen and tough
underbelly of professional tennis. It is the rough and tumble
world of tennis’s minor leagues: a place where most players will
not make it to the tennis elite but continue playing with the
competitive fire necessary to get a chance at that level, and if for
nothing else, to play for the love of the game. Players are
43. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
44. Tennis Program, IMG ACAD., [https://perma.cc/9MFV-Y8KM] (last visited Sept.
29, 2019).
45. David Waldstein, As Tennis Tries to Thin Its Pro Ranks, the College Game May
Suffer, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), [https://perma.cc/E952-4GSM] [hereinafter Waldstein,
The College Game].
46. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
47. See Waldstein, The College Game, supra note 45.
48. See, e.g., ASS’N PRESS, supra note 38; Lewak, supra note 38; Michael Bane &
Danielle Gescheit, Rich Rewards for Those at the Top in Tennis, but What of the Rest?, THE
CONVERSATION (Jan. 18, 2015, 2:21 PM), [https://perma.cc/2L5V-6DNU]; Waldstein,
Thousands Play On, supra note 32; Miguel Morales, How the 92nd-Ranked Tennis Player
in the World Earns a Comfortable Living, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2013), [https://perma.cc/EAF2WZYV]; Wayne A. Grove, et al., Why So Many Tennis Players Go Pro Even Though Few
‘Make it,’ THE CONVERSATION (Jan. 4, 2018, 3:32 PM), [https://perma.cc/S2F3-9YHS].
49. See Morales, supra note 48.

562

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:3

typically ranked outside of the world’s top 100, and there are few
endorsements to help with expenses.50 After all, who wants to
invest in a player who will not even draw more than a handful of
fans at any given tournament and get little to no media air time?
If endorsements do exist, they are usually in the form of
equipment sponsorships to, at minimum, help the players afford
their tennis racquets.51 Many tennis players spend an entire career
playing in tennis’s minor leagues, not dissimilar to baseball’s
minor leagues.52
IV. THE STORY OF TWO RISING TENNIS STARS
To show how the NCAA’s no-agent rule can play a pivotal
and disruptive role in the life of a tennis player going through this
process, introductions are necessary for Maria Genovese (nee
Shishkina) and Katerina Stewart. For similar, yet individually
different reasons, Maria and Katerina are case studies for why the
no-agent rule needs to be abolished.
Maria Genovese was a child tennis prodigy growing up in
Kazakhstan.53 Her coaches and parents alike knew at a young age
that she was endowed with tennis talents that could launch her
onto the world stage of elite tennis.54 Not having the type of local
training facility necessary to challenge and develop Maria’s
talents, her mother sold her business in Kazakhstan to accompany
Maria to the IMG Academy in Bradenton, Florida.55 It was
certainly a risk; after all, Maria was only seven years old, but all
indications pointed to her being the real deal.56 By the age of
eleven, she signed a scholarship deal to train at IMG Academy.57
Shortly thereafter she signed a sponsorship deal with Under

50. See Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
51. See id.
52. See Morales, supra note 48; Waldstein, The Lonely Road, supra note 31.
53. See, e.g., Lindsay Berra, Future Shock, ESPN THE MAG (June 15, 2010),
[https://perma.cc/ZX9B-MDRH]; Telephone Interview with Maria Genovese, Student, Tyler
Community College (Apr. 22, 2018); E-mail from Maria Genovese, Student, Tyler
Community College, to author (Jan. 10, 2019, 15:42 EST) (on file with author).
54. See Berra, supra note 53.
55. Telephone Interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53; see also Berra, supra
note 53.
56. See Berra, supra note 53.
57. See id.
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Armour.58 Maria’s junior tennis world ranking cracked the top
100 by the time she was fourteen.59 It appeared the risk was
destined to pay off.
However, two unfortunate and untimely wrist injuries and
surgeries stifled her career.60 Because of the gap in playing time
to tend to the injuries, she lost her ranking, sponsors, and agents.61
When she resumed play, she found it difficult to regain the footing
she once had. Her ranking flat lined, and she found herself at a
crossroads: whether she could afford to continue to pursue a
professional career or whether, instead, instead she could go to
college, where, despite her depressed world rankings, she still had
the talent to earn a scholarship for tennis and compete at a highlevel in the NCAAs.62
However, due to the NCAA’s no-agent rule, it turned out
Maria could not afford the collegiate route. The NCAA deemed
her ineligible to compete in NCAA governed intercollegiate
athletics due to her agency and sponsorship deals, in direct
violation of the rule.63 Even with agency, sponsorship, and partial
scholarship to the IMG Academy helping with her tennis
expenses up to that point, Maria did not have enough money to
afford college without scholarship help.64 The scholarship help
she would have relied upon was an athletic scholarship to play
intercollegiate tennis. So instead of pursuing a four-year degree,
Maria enrolled at Tyler Junior College in Texas.65 This was a far
cry from where Maria and her family envisioned things would end
up after uprooting from Kazakhstan and moving to the United
States.66

58. Mic Huber, Shishkina Picking Up the Pieces, HERALD-TRIB. (Mar. 26, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/5UGV-2JUV].
59. Telephone Interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53; Huber, supra note 58.
60. Huber, supra note 58.
61. Id.
62. Telephone interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53.
63. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
64. Telephone interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53.
65. Id. See generally Phil Hicks, NJCAA Tennis: ASA Miami Edges TJC, Hillsborough
for National Title, TYLER MORNING TELEGRAPH (May 9, 2019), [https://perma.cc/CJ9HR58U].
66. Upon completely two years at Tyler Junior College, Maria is now playing NAIA
level tennis at Georgia Gwinnett College. 2019-20 Women’s Tennis Roster, GEORGIA
GWINNETT GRIZZLIES, [https://perma.cc/N8XC-G6SY] (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
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Katerina Stewart represents a similar occasion where the noagent rule foreclosed a collegiate tennis option. Katerina, a rising
young American tennis star, was the runner-up in the
Charlottesville tournament in 2015 and had skyrocketed to a
world ranking of 158 that summer.67 Her ranking allowed her to
play in the qualifying rounds of the four biggest stages of
professional tennis between 2014 and 2016: the major
tournaments of Wimbledon, U.S. Open, French Open, and
Australian Open.68 Indeed, she was on nearly every short list of
young American tennis player on the rise.69
However, not only did Katerina make the tough decision to
go to college and get a degree, thus putting her promising
professional career on hold for four years, she made a bold and
honorable choice to join the military by enrolling in the United
States Military Academy Preparatory School, a one-year program
which upon successful completion leads to appointment to the
four-year program at the United States Military Academy at West
Point.70 Not only was Katerina’s professional tennis career on
hold during college, but the West Point’s five-year active duty
service requirement upon graduation meant that she would have
to put off any realistic hope of continuing her professional tennis
career for a total of nine years.71 Still, she would be able to fulfill
her dream of serving in her country’s military while at the same
time competing with the Army West Point Women’s Tennis
Team.72
Or so she thought. While reviewing Katerina’s records to
determine how much playing eligibility she would have once
entering the military academy’s four-year program—it was
initially thought she would have to sit out one year due to
academic ineligibility because of the alternative, online schooling
67. Cindy Shmerler, ‘Cadet Candidate Wimbledon’: A Tennis Star Enlists Her Backup
Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016), [https://perma.cc/4J26-VD85]; see also Rick Vach,
Tennis Briefs: USTA French Wild Card Race; Florida Cup Results, USTA FLA. (May 5,
2015), [https://perma.cc/ZM76-8R2B].
68. Tennis Australia: Grand Slams, TENNIS, [https://perma.cc/7SP7-WTM8] (last
visited Oct. 14, 2019).
69. See Patrick Sauer, Katerina Stewart Quit Pro Tennis for the Army, Will It Derail
Her Career?, VICE (Aug. 24, 2016), [https://perma.cc/FY9C-YXJZ].
70. See Schmerler, supra note 66.
71. Your Career After West Point, WEST POINT, [https://perma.cc/DH57-NRGJ] (last
visited Oct. 1, 2019).
72. See Schmerler, supra note 66.
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she completed while training for tennis—West Point’s
compliance office learned that Katerina’s parents had previously
hired an agent to help them navigate their daughter’s promising
professional career.73 It was not that anyone tried to hide that
information, and it was disclosed when inquired about, but it was
something that Katerina and her parents did not think would
matter in terms of her playing tennis at the collegiate level.74
West Point’s compliance office then advised Katerina and her
parents that the NCAA was very strict about the no-agent rule and
even if appealed, it was a very real possibility that the NCAA
would deem Katerina ineligible to compete for all four years of
her Academy enrollment.75
While Katerina still wanted to serve in the military, the
thought of not being able to compete in tennis for her four
collegiate years before her five-year service commitment and
sitting on the sidelines unable to support her fellow cadets
competing in collegiate tennis was just too much.76 Ultimately,
she decided to disenroll from the military academy prepatory
school and resume her pro career.77 It was a bold move to serve
her country in the first place, and perhaps Katerina could still
pursue that option in the future, but it would have to be a dream
deferred.
73. Interview with Katerina Stewart, Sanchez Casel Tennis Academy, in Naples, Fla.
(June 1, 2018); Interview with Army West Point Intercollegiate Athletics Compliance
Office, in West Point, N.Y.; Interview with Paul Peck, Head Coach, Army West Point
Women’s Tennis, in West Point, N.Y. See Steve Navaroli, Making Return to Tennis,
Katerina Stewart Finds Her Outlook Has Shifted, LANCASTER ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/8TJ8-9PE3] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
74. Interview with Katerina Stewart, supra note 72; see Navaroli, supra note 72.
75. Id.
76. Interview with Katerina Stewart, supra note 72. Author’s note: Regarding Katerina
Stewart’s decision upon hearing she would likely be ineligible to play college tennis: West
Point champions the notion that its admitted cadets show incredible potential for increased
potential in four “pillars”: military, academic, physical, and character. A well-rounded,
admitted cadet would ideally show great potential in all four pillars, yet almost every cadet
can point to one or two of those pillars that is their “strong suit,” which most likely catapulted
their overall applicant file to an offer for admission. For Katerina, that strong suit was her
athletic prowess on the tennis court, proving her propensity for potential in the physical
pillar, having proved she could eventually compete at a very high professional level but
opting for college. For the Academy, Katerina’s strongest contribution to the Corps of
Cadets would be in the physical pillar through her athletic abilities in the sport of tennis.
However, the NCAA no-agent rule disqualified her from intercollegiate competition
rendering her unable to participate in the sport that made her stand out in the physical pillar.
77. See Navaroli, supra note 72.
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V. BREAK POINT: THE ISSUE
This leads to the crux of the problem: the no-agent rule
profoundly affects the decision-making process of some tennis
players aspiring to compete at high levels and disqualifies others
who were not aware of the prohibition. The simplest question is,
is it a fair rule? From a legal perspective, is there some type of
recourse that could have changed the outcomes for these two
athletes or others? Neither Maria or Katerina, nor their parents,
were acting nefariously when hiring agents. Nor were the parents
trying to sabotage the career options of their children. To the
contrary, these parents were acting in their children’s best
interests. Their children’s coaches and trainers advised them that
their daughters possessed pro-level talents; the players
themselves wanted to continue to compete and seek the next level;
and the parents were new to this process and needed help
navigating the unfamiliar waters of a child’s budding pro-tennis
career.78 Additionally, the parents wanted to ensure their children
had a professional voice representing them to help stave off any
attempts to exploit their child’s talents.79
Did these families know the agency agreement would
foreclose the potential option of their child competing in NCAA
athletics? Was that eventuality even on their radar screen? Did
their children, the beneficiaries of the agency relationship, know
it could foreclose a tennis playing option down the road? Could
the child even be expected to have the maturity and life
experience to make the agency agreement decision or draw the
unforeseen conclusions that their parents were unable to draw?
The answer to all these questions is obviously no,80 which
sets up the questions this Article attempts to answer. Is there a
viable legal recourse for these families and should there be a
policy change to avoid putting future unwitting tennis players in
the unenviable position of being deemed ineligible for collegiate
competition based on their or their families’ benign actions years
ago? The legal question sets up a classic contract law discussion.
The policy question then explores whether the potential legal
pitfalls of the rule beg for the rule’s elimination. This discussion
78. See generally Schmerler, supra note 66; Berra, supra note 53.
79. See Schmerler, supra note 66; Berra, supra note 53.
80. Id.
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is informed by the analysis of whether the goal of preserving
amateurism in the world of tennis is really served by the no-agent
rule.
IV. THE CODE: RELEVANT NCAA RULES
REGULATING PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
An examination of the NCAA bylaws regarding collegiate
athlete eligibility in the context of sports agents requires a look at
how the NCAA defines an agent:
An agent is any individual who, directly or indirectly:
(a) Represents or attempts to represent an individual for the
purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation
for financial gain; or (b) Seeks to obtain any type of financial
gain or benefit from securing a prospective student-athlete’s
enrollment at an educational institution or from a studentathlete’s potential earnings as a professional athlete. An
agent may include, but is not limited to, a certified contract
advisor, financial advisor, marketing representative, brand
manager or anyone who is employed or associated with such
persons.81

Further, the NCAA no-agent rule states the following:
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an
intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed (orally or in
writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that
sport. Further, an agency contract not specifically limited in
writing to a sport or particular sports shall be deemed
applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible
to participate in any sport.82

Note that this no-agent rule does not require one to have a
written contract with or make any payments to an agent to result
in violation of the rule. Immediately following the general rule is
Bylaw 12.3.1.1, a recently revised exception that accommodates
high school agency contracts by baseball and men’s ice hockey
players:
In baseball and men’s ice hockey, prior to full-time
collegiate enrollment, an individual who is drafted by a
81. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.02.1, at 61.
82. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
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professional baseball or men’s ice hockey team may be
represented by an agent or attorney during contract
negotiations. The individual may not receive benefits (other
than representation) from the agent or attorney and must pay
the going rate for the representation. If the individual does
not sign a contract with the professional team, the agreement
for representation with the agent or attorney must be
terminated prior to full-time collegiate enrollment.83

Bylaw 12.1.2.4, “Exceptions to Amateurism Rule,” also
provides accommodations for tennis players, but the exception
involves acceptance of prize money at tournaments and does not
relieve these players from NCAA athletic disqualification due to
hiring an agent:
In tennis, prior to full-time collegiate enrollment, an
individual may accept up to $10,000 per calendar year in
prize money based on his or her place finish or performance
in athletics events. Such prize money may be provided only
by the sponsor of an event in which the individual
participates. Once the individual has accepted $10,000 in
prize money in a particular year, he or she may receive
additional prize money on a per-event basis, provided such
prize money does not exceed the individual’s actual and
necessary expenses for participation in the event. The
calculation of actual and necessary expenses shall not
include the expenses or fees of anyone other than the
individual (e.g., coach’s fees or expenses, parent’s
expenses).84

In tennis, after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, an
individual may accept prize money based on his or her place
finish or performance in an athletics event. Such prize money
may not exceed actual and necessary expenses and may be
provided only by the sponsor of the event. The calculation of
actual and necessary expenses shall not include the expenses or
fees of anyone other than the individual (e.g., coach’s fees or
expenses, family member’s expenses).85

83. Id. at Bylaw 12.3.1.1.
84. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2.1, at 66.
85. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2.2.
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Taking a step back and examining what the no-agent rule
attempts to achieve requires a look at one of the “dominant”
principles, Principle 2.9, the NCAA Manual highlights:
Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate
sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily
by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits
to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be
protected from exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.86

Of the “Commitments to the Division I Collegiate Model,”
this no-agent rule most closely relates to “The Commitment to
Amateurism”:
Member institutions shall conduct their athletics
programs for students who choose to participate in
intercollegiate athletics as a part of their educational
experience and in accordance with NCAA bylaws, thus
maintaining a line of demarcation between student-athletes
who participate in the Collegiate Model and athletes
competing in the professional model.87

This is followed by Article 12, “Amateurism and Athletics
Eligibility,” which starts off with the following section with
Bylaw 12.01, “General Principles.”
12.01.1 Eligibility for Intercollegiate Athletics. Only
an amateur student-athlete is eligible for intercollegiate
athletics participation in a particular sport.
12.01.2 Clear Line of Demarcation.
Member
institutions’ athletics programs are designed to be an integral
part of the educational program. The student-athlete is
considered an integral part of the student body, thus
maintaining a clear line of demarcation between college
athletics and professional sports.
12.01.3 “Individual” vs. “Student-Athlete.” NCAA
amateur status may be lost as a result of activities prior to
enrollment in college. If NCAA rules specify that an
“individual” may or may not participate in certain activities,
this term refers to a person prior to and after enrollment in a
member institution. If NCAA rules specify a “student86. Id. at Principle 2.9, at 4.
87. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at xii.
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athlete,” the legislation applies only to that person’s
activities after enrollment.88

Few would complain about the foregoing NCAA’s
commitment to amateurism in intercollegiate athletics and its
rules to ensure common understanding of what defines an
amateur and what does not.
Preserving amateurism in
intercollegiate athletics is what draws many to watch and support
it. Collegiate sports is the last bastion of pure amateur sports
before a few of these athletes make the jump to the professional
ranks. The NCAA’s commitment to amateurism allows most
collegiate athletes to compete on a field that is not filled with paid
athletes.
However, in light of a typical career path of a tennis player
with talents to compete at the highest collegiate level, is the noagent rule legally problematic and an unnecessary obstacle? Can
the rule be squared with the exceptions provided to tennis
regarding prize money and baseball and hockey regarding agents
and attorneys? This analysis will begin with a basic survey of
contract law implications of a child-athlete’s agreement with an
agent, followed by a policy analysis in light of the highlighted
legal challenges. However, it is helpful to begin with a review of
other writings on the topic.
VII. CRITICAL REVIEWS OF NCAA ELIGIBILITY
RULES
Several law journal articles have critiqued the no-agent rule
in similar contexts as this Article, five of which are highlighted
below. All of them take various positions in their criticisms, and
most of them focus on the rule’s impact on a particular sport. In
terms of court case precedent, three or four of the same cases
repeatedly show up in most of these articles. Notably, it is the
Oliver v. NCAA decision, discussed in more detail later in this
Article, that is most frequently mentioned.89
Any serious inquiry into the NCAA’s no-agent rule must
start with Professor Porto’s article, What Recruiter’s Don’t Tell
Athletes and Athletes Don’t Think to Ask: A Critique of the

88. Id. at Bylaw 12.01, at 61.
89. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203 (Ohio C.P. Erie Cty. 2009).
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NCAA’s Nonacademic Eligibility Rules.90
In addition to
reviewing other NCAA Manual rules such as the “National Letter
of Intent,” the “Transfer Rules,” and the “No Draft Rule,” the
article provides a very plainspoken introduction to the “No-Agent
Rule.”91 As the title suggests, the article would serve as a good
reference for any college-bound athletes whose talents are
inspiring them to test the waters for a potential professional
career. The article not only reviews the no-agent rule’s
components—some of which are not intuitive to the casual sports
fan—but it also discusses how the NCAA interprets the rule.92
Also embedded in the article’s title is the reality that many
talented young athletes who tread precariously close to NCAA
rule violations are simply unaware of some of the traps for unwary
that are highlighted in this Article.
Another good primer for learning about the no-agent and
related NCAA eligibility rules is Professor Richard Karcher’s
article, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in
the Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best
Interest of the Amateur Athlete?93 This Article is the one of four
discussed in this comment that evaluates the no-agent rule’s
impact on baseball.94 However, Professor Karcher’s article is the
only one that predates the Oliver decision.95 Professor Karcher’s
article begins with a thorough but general survey of the rule and
poses the question, “who is the NCAA trying to protect?”96 In
doing so, Professor Karcher tees up the conundrum of the rule as
it applies to all sports: if the NCAA is instituting the rule to protect
athletes against exploitation, is the rule having the unintended
impact of dissuading athletes from seeking assistance from

90. See generally Brian L. Porto, What Recruiter’s Don’t Tell Athletes and Athletes
Don’t Think to Ask: A Critique of the NCAA’s Nonacademic Eligibility Rules, 13 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 240, 244 (2014).
91. See id.
92. See generally id. at 259-65.
93. Richard Karcher, The NCAA’s Regulations Related to the Use of Agents in the
Sport of Baseball: Are the Rules Detrimental to the Best Interest of the Amateur Athlete?, 7
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 215 (2005).
94. See id. at 216; Busby, supra note 6, at 140; Lockhart, supra note 6, at 179-80;
Stross, supra note 6, at 170.
95. See Karcher, supra note 92, at 216; Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio C.P.
Erie Cnty. 2009).
96. Karcher, supra note 92, at 215-16.
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available resources that can help shield them from such
exploitation?97
In The NCAA’s “No-Agent” Rule: Blurring Amateurism,
Matthew Stross also thoroughly surveys the no-agent rule and its
role in the NCAA bylaws.98 He makes the case that the by-laws,
in general, have already so badly blurred the lines between
professionalism and amateurism that the no-agent rule is
practically meaningless.99 His theme is that the rule does not
advance the cause of preserving amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics.100 While striking a dubious tone as to whether NCAA
athletics are truly non-professional, he analyzes the issue through
the unique lens of baseball and how high school players must be
especially cautious of the no-agent rule when negotiating with a
professional team.101
Continuing the theme of how the no-agent rule impacts
baseball, T. Matthew Lockhart takes a closer look at the Oliver
ruling and analyzes what it portends for the future in Oliver v.
NCAA: Throwing a Contractual Curveball at the NCAA’s “Veil
of Amateurism.”102 Lockhart also uses baseball as a case study,
not coincidentally since Oliver decision involved a major league’s
baseball negotiations with a high school baseball player.103 From
the contract angle, Lockhart finds support in Oliver for the theory
that the prospective NCAA athlete is a third-party beneficiary of
the “contract” between the NCAA and its member colleges and
universities—the contract being the NCAA rules that regulate the
athletic programs at member schools.104 As such, the prospective
NCAA student athlete has standing to challenge the NCAA rules
and would prevail if the court finds the rules arbitrary and
capricious.105 Lockhart discusses how the Oliver court found the
no-agent rule to be arbitrary and capricious, ruling in favor of
restoring the baseball player’s collegiate eligibility.106
97. See id.
98. See generally Stross, supra note 6, at 170.
99. See id. at 180-83.
100. See id. at 183-87.
101. See id. at 183-84.
102. See generally Lockhart, supra note 6.
103. See id. at 175-80.
104. See id. at 188-89, 191.
105. See id. at 188-89.
106. See id. at 193.
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In Playing for Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must Require a
Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of StudentAthletes, J. Winston Busby focuses more generally on NCAA
eligibility rules and uses football as an example in arguing that a
prospective student-athlete should not be penalized for the NCAA
violations or otherwise illegal activities of those acting at his or
her behest if the athlete was not aware of these activities.107 The
issue involved Cam Newton’s collegiate eligibility when it was
determined his father had engaged in a pay-for-play marketing
scheme in which he allegedly solicited money from boosters in
exchange for his son’s commitment to play football at Auburn
University.108 Busby surveys the NCAA eligibility process,
highlighting the “restitution rule,” through which the NCAA
holds member schools accountable, and the “reinstatement”
process, which deals with the eligibility of individual athletes.109
While this Article acknowledges that the challengers to NCAA
rules have often been unsuccessful in courts on various theories,
such as antitrust arguments, it ultimately concludes that the rules
do not serve the individual athlete’s best interest when they
penalize them for transgressions of which they had no knowledge
or participation.110
An interesting postscript to the review of these articles,
particularly the ones focused on baseball, is that the NCAA
bylaws instituted a change after their publication. Bylaw
12.3.1.1, titled “Exception—Baseball and Men’s Ice Hockey—
Prior to Full-Time Collegiate Enrollment,” allows baseball
players to be represented by an agent or a lawyer during contract
negotiations without losing their collegiate sports eligibility, so
long as they, among other requirements, terminate the agency
relationship prior to college enrollment.111 This rule was not
present in the 2015-16 NCAA Manual, but it was included in all
future versions.112 Without knowing exactly what precipitated
107. J. Winston Busby, Playing for Love: Why the NCAA Rules Must Require a
Knowledge-Intent Element to Affect the Eligibility of Student-Athletes, 42 CUMB. L. REV.
135 (2012).
108. See id. at 137-38.
109. See id. at 150, 157-58.
110. See id. at 178-80.
111. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 71.
112. NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2016-2017 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 63 (2016); NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2017-2018 NCAA
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the addition of this rule, it is interesting to note that the new
exception postdated all five of the scholarly articles reviewed
above and would fully permit the agent/attorney involvement that
caused the rule violation in the Oliver case.113
This Article builds on the common themes of these and other
articles and attempts to critique the no agent rule via new avenues.
This Article does not enter the fray of accusing the NCAA of
being a money-making enterprise to the extent it is incapable of
preserving amateurism, much like the Stross article reads.114
However, it follows Stross’s theme that amateurism at the NCAA
is indeed blurred, and more importantly, that a draconian rule like
the no-agent rule no more erodes amateur status on the tennis
courts than some of the other quasi-professional accommodations
the NCAA rules makes for the sport. Similar to the Lockhart
article analysis,115 this article looks at the no-agent rule through
the lens of contract law but adds a discussion of the third-party
beneficiary concept from a different angle—that in which the
prospective NCAA student athlete is a third-party beneficiary in
the “contract” between a parent and an agent. Continuing along
the contract theme, this article also overlays the no-agent rule
problem with the contract concepts of unconscionability and
liberty to enter a contract.
VIII. THE RALLY: THREE CONTRACT LAW
THEORIES
A. Voiding the Agency Agreement?
A starting point in the contract law analysis is determining
whether the prospective student-athlete has any chance of
retroactively voiding their own or their parents’ agreement with
the agent such that it is decided by the courts (and hopefully the
NCAA) that the contract never existed. In contract law parlance,
a minor’s action of voiding a contract they entered is known as

Dɪᴠɪsɪᴏɴ I Mᴀɴᴜᴀʟ, 71 (2017); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.3.1.1; NCAA
MANUAL, 2019-2020, supra note 7, at Bylaw 12.3.1.1, at 72 (2019).
113. See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
114. See generally Stross, supra note 6.
115. See generally Lockhart, supra note 6.
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“disaffirmance,” whereas if an adult wants to negate a contract
they entered, it is called “rescission.”116
If it is the prospective NCAA student-athlete tennis player
who actually signed the contract, the questions are whether a
“minor”—a person who has not reached the age of “majority,”117
(eighteen in most states)118—can legally enter contracts and
whether they can get out of contracts they have once entered.
Contrary to a commonly held belief, a minor can legally enter into
enforceable contracts.119 However, the contracts are voidable at
their option, meaning that the minor, while still underage, may
choose to revoke, or “disaffirm,” that contract.120 Courts have
generally honored the request of minors who later decide to void
their contracts, so long as the contract is not for “necessities.”121
Voiding these contracts is only at the option for the minor and not
for the contracting adult.122
However, for the young tennis player, the idea of backing
out of the contract with their agent is likely a non-sequitur. First,
116. See Harvey v. Hadfield, 372 P.2d 985, 986 (Utah 1962) (“Since time immemorial
courts have quite generally recognized the justice and propriety of refusing to enforce
contracts against minors, except for necessities. It is fair to assume that because of their
immaturity they may lack the judgment, experience and will power which they should have
to bind themselves to what may turn out to be burdensome and long-lasting obligations.
Consequently, courts are properly solicitous of their rights and afford them protection from
being taken advantage of by designing persons, and from their own imprudent acts, by
allowing them to disaffirm contracts entered into during minority which upon more mature
reflection they conclude are undesirable.”)
117. 42 AM. JUR. 2D Infants § 6, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 2019).
118. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6500 (West 1992); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 2
(McKinney 1974); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5101 (1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 1-3-105 (2017).
119. Harvey, 372 P.2d at 986.
120. See id.
121. See Gastonia Personnel Corp. v. Rogers, 172 S.E.2d 19, 20 (N.C. 1970). There,
Chief Justice Bobbitt quoted the following (in the original language) with approval:
An early commentary on the common law, after the general statement that
contracts made by persons (infants) before attaining the age of twenty-one
“may be avoided,” sets forth “some exceptions out of this generality,” to wit:
“An infant may bind himselfe to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, apparell,
necessary physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his good
teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards.”
Id. at 20 (quoting COKE ON LITTLETON 172 (13th ed. 1788)); see also Valencia v. White,
654 P.2d 287, 288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of
the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481,
489 (1994) (“This narrow definition usually included ‘board, room, clothing, medical n eeds
and education.’” (quoting Valencia, 654 P.2d at 289)).
122. See DiMatteo, supra note 120, at 487.
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the tennis player is probably not focused on what might happen if
their tennis career fails to progress as they had hoped. That is, the
consideration of whether the agency agreement they or their
parents just entered will imperil a collegiate tennis career is
probably not first and foremost on their mind.123 It follows that if
the legal status of entering such a contract is not on the young
player’s mind, neither is the question whether there is anything
they can do if they later decide the contract was not a good idea.
Similarly, the adult parents of the player who enter the
agency contract are also unlikely to consider those worst-case
scenarios. The “here and now” for both them and their child is
trying to manage the career of a child with professional talents
and aspirations. Only if the parents were dissatisfied with the
product they received in the agency agreement, or if they thought
it was not worth their investment, would they consider backing
out of the deal.124 Finally, the agents, like many businesses, are
likely reticent to even allow minors to enter into these contracts
to avoid the possibility of having a contract voided at the option
of the minor.125
However, the question of whether a minor tennis player can
void an agency agreement is all predicated on the assumption
such action would make a difference to the NCAA. As a private
organization, the NCAA typically enjoys significant deference
from the courts.126 Further, their bylaws related to the interplay
of agents and prospective NCAA student-athletes appear
straightforward. That is, “An individual shall be ineligible for
participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she ever has agreed
(orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose
of marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport”
appears to be irrespective of whether the contract is later
determined to be legally voided.127
But what if it is the more likely scenario of the parent signing
the agency agreement? Would the minor tennis player have any
123. See generally Lockhart, supra note 6, at 192-95.
124. Id.
125. I.B. ex rel. Fife v. Facebook, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 2d 989, 1000 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(“It is the policy of the law to . . . discourage adults from contracting with an infant.”).
126. See Matthew J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and
Legal Protection of Sports Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 119
(2008) (describing years of judicial deference toward the NCAA).
127. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.

2019

DOUBLE FAULT

577

legal recourse after the agency agreement relationship with their
parents has ended and the tennis player realizes the consequence
of not being able to play professional tennis? That is, what if
either Maria Genovese or Katerina Stewart or anyone similarly
situated are on the precipice of signing to play tennis at the NCAA
level and has third-person buyer’s remorse of their parent’s
decision to enter that agency agreement? This question requires
a discussion of the contract concept of third-party beneficiaries.
The previously cited Lockhart and Stross articles discuss the
concept of third-party beneficiary status in the construct of the
prospective collegiate athlete being the third-party beneficiary to
the “contract” between the NCAA and its member school.128
However, they do not examine the concept from the perspective
of the minor athlete’s status vis-à-vis their parent’s contract with
an agent. For starters, a minor tennis player’s role in a contract
between a parent and an agent is as close to the textbook
definition of third-party beneficiary status as one could get.129
The benefit to the parents entering the agency agreement is that
they get advice and guidance on how to best navigate the
uncharted waters of their child’s promising professional tennis
career.130 They also get the benefits of the agent’s legwork, which
includes actively managing the player’s career, helping determine
which tournaments they should enter, and otherwise promoting
and marketing the player’s brand.131 From the minor player’s
perspective, they are the party who reaps the most tangible
benefits of these efforts, and indeed they are the entire reason the
128. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-89, 191; Stross, supra note 6, at 174, 179.
129. For example, A and B enter into an agreement whereby A agrees to give valuable
consideration to C, whereas A is the promisor, B is the promisee, and C is the beneficiary of
the promise. Third-party beneficiary law defines the rights of C to enforce the provisions of
the contract between A and B. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §
774, at 727 (1952). See also Gifford v. Corrigan, 22 N.E. 756, 758 (N.Y. 1889) (recovery
by third-party beneficiary is based on equities of the transaction); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y.
268, 269-75 (1859) (C may enforce contract where A paid $300 for B’s promise to pay C);
Meyerson v. New Idea Hosiery Co., 115 So. 94, 95 (Ala. 1927); Chung Kee v. Davidson, 36
P. 519, 521 (Cal. 1894); Dean v. Walker, 107 Ill. 540, 545 (1882); McNamee v. Withers, 37
Md. 171, 179 (Md. 1872); Kaufman v. U.S. Nat’l Bank, 48 N.W. 738, 739 (Neb. 1891);
Feldman v. McGuire, 55 P. 872, 873 (Or. 1899); Urquhart v. Brayton, 12 R.I. 169, 171 -72
(1878); Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 93 N.W. 440, 443 (Wis. 1903).
130. See Ahiza Garcia, So You Want to Be a Sports Agent? Here’s What You Should
Know, CNN MONEY (May 26, 2018), [https://perma.cc/NL9N-KANG].
131. Stacey B. Evans, Sports Agents: Ethical Representatives or Overly Aggressive
Adversaries?, 17 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 91, 91-92 (2010).
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deal was entered. It is their tennis career that is managed and
promoted much like one would expect a sports agent to do.
Could, then, a third-party beneficiary minor use their
disaffirmance power to retroactively void a contract their parents
entered when they were a minor? That remedy is probably not
likely for a couple of reasons. First, the question of third-party
beneficiary rights usually turns on whether the third party could
sue the principal of a contract for non-performance of their end of
the bargain.132 An example situation in the tennis agency realm
is when the minor tennis player feels the agent is not upholding
his end of the deal, and the minor’s parents are unable or
unwilling to force this issue. In that situation, the legal question
is whether the third-party’s interests in the contract have
“vested.”133 If those interests have vested, the minor tennis player
would have standing to enforce the contract; if they have not, then
the minor would not have standing.134 However, it is unlikely the
courts would entertain a case where the minor third-party
beneficiary can disaffirm the contract because, as a third-party
beneficiary, they are not actually considered a party to the
contract, from a legal perspective.135
The second problem is that even if it were the parents who
signed the contract and they wanted to rescind the contract, a
retroactive rescission would not likely be allowed because, in
most of these situations, the contractual duties are no longer
present; that is the contractual duties for both parties have been
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
133. There are three classes of third-party beneficiaries: “(a) a donee beneficiary if it
appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances that the
purpose of the promisee in obtaining the promise of all or part of the performance thereof is
to make a gift to the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor to some
performance neither due nor supposed or asserted to be due from the promisee to the
beneficiary; (b) a creditor beneficiary if no purpose to make a gift appears from the terms of
the promise in view of the accompanying circumstances and performance of the promise will
satisfy an actual or supposed or asserted duty of the promisee to the beneficiary, or a right of
the beneficiary against the promisee which has been barred by the statute of Limitations or
by a discharge in bankruptcy, or which is unenforceable because of the Statute of Frauds; (c)
an incidental beneficiary if neither the facts stated in Clause (a) nor those stated in Clause
(b) exist.” RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
134. See Gifford, 22 N.E. at 757.
135. The Restatement’s defining of the types of third-party beneficiaries is to help
discern whether the third-party, who is not a party to the contract and thus ordinarily not able
to demand enforcement of it, can nonetheless do so if they are the correct type of third-party
beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133.
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satisfied, or “discharged.”136 If that is the case, then the contract
does not technically exist anymore.137 Thus, it is extremely
difficult to rescind a contract for which both parties have already
fulfilled their obligations. Most states have time periods by which
a party or parties can rescind the contract, and if both parties have
fulfilled their contractual duties, the most likely route to rescind
would be if both parties mutually agree to rescind.138 For a player
or parents who have buyer’s remorse long after the contract is
entered, it is unlikely the agent will agree to give their money back
and even more unlikely a court could find a mutually acceptable
way to make both parties whole.
From the NCAA’s perspective, the analysis of whether it is
possible for a sports agency contract to be retroactively rescinded
by the parent or minor may be for naught. That is, even if the
parties were to mutually agree to rescind the contract or if a court
ordered rescission as a contract dispute remedy, would that matter
to the NCAA? The NCAA’s directive seems quite clear: “if he or
she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an
agent for the purpose of marketing his or her athletics ability or
reputation in that sport.”139 Thus, even if a court ordered
rescission of a contract and put the world on notice that the
contract once entered by the two parties is no longer, would the
NCAA rule, as written, still be violated?
As a private organization, the NCAA enjoys the advantage
of autonomy, operated separately from publicly funded
universities, as well as the corresponding deference by the
courts.140 Thus, unless a court decision or order directly relates
to a contract the NCAA entered into, which is not the case here,
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235.
137. See id.
138. See generally New York Tel. Co. v. Jamestown Tel. Corp., 26 N.E.2d 295, 29798 (N.Y. 1940); Capstone Enters. v. Cty. of Westchester, 691 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y. App. Div.
1999); Adrian Family Partners v. ExxonMobil Corp., 878 N.Y.S.2d 140, 142 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2009) (citing New York state interpretation of the right to rescind a contract and the
difficulty in doing so 1) after the contract benefits have been accepted, and 2) if the intent to
rescind is not made clear in a prompt manner: “[A] plaintiff waive[s] its right to seek
rescission of the . . . agreement by failing to promptly seek rescission after accepting the
benefits of that agreement”). See also Megan Bittakis, The Time Should Begin to Run When
the Deed Is Done: A Proposed Solution to Problems in Applying Limitations Periods to the
Rescission of Contracts, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 755, 759-60 (2010).
139. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
140. See Mitten & Davis, supra note 125, at 119.
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the NCAA is not directly impacted by the legal ramifications of
the court ruling and could decide for itself whether to change its
stance because of a prospective collegiate athlete’s previous, but
now voided, agency relationship.141 Based on the NCAA’s
articulated commitment to amateurism and their clearly worded
prohibition of an agreement with an agent,142 valid contract or not,
it is unlikely such a scenario would provide a prospective NCAA
student athlete relief in the eyes of the NCAA.
The foregoing illustrates why an effort by a prospective
collegiate athlete to dissociate from a previous agent arrangement
presents more potential pitfalls than opportunities for success.
The argument that the no-agent rule fails under an arbitrary and
capricious standard seems more destined for success.
The better approach for finding a legal remedy if a
prospective NCAA student-athlete has fallen victim to the noagent rule is to explore the third-party beneficiary relationship
theory in the same manner as the previous writings and court
cases. 143 That is, the prospective NCAA student-athlete is a thirdparty beneficiary of the “contract” between the NCAA and the
member schools it regulates. This would open the door to
achieving standing, or the legal status of being able to challenge
the rule in our court system.144 Once standing is obtained, the
three best remedies to explore would be obtaining a legal
determination that the no-agent rule: (1) is arbitrary and
capricious, (2) is unconscionable, or (3) improperly interferes
with the liberty to contract.145
B. An Arbitrary and Capricious Rule?
The NCAA bylaws, including the no-agent rule, give the
NCAA an extremely lopsided bargaining position when it comes
to a collegiate athlete’s eligibility.146 The NCAA sets the terms
141. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
142. Id. at xii & 71.
143. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-91; Stross, supra note 6, at 174, 179.
144. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-89 (discussing the theory under which a
student-athlete could establish standing as a third-party beneficiary in the contract between
the NCAA and its member schools).
145. See id. at 189; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (AM. LAW INST.
1981); Mitten & Davis, supra note 125, at 120.
146. See Stross, supra note 6, at 178, 190.
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for intercollegiate athletic teams and, as a private organization,
the NCAA can set the rules as it wishes so long as they do not
otherwise violate the law.147 Thus, for the prospective collegiate
athlete, it is a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. That is, if they want
to compete at the Division I level, they must abide by the NCAA’s
rules. According to the NCAA, the necessity for these rules is to
preserve the demarcation between collegiate and professional
athletics.148
Enter the arbitrary and capricious contract theory.149 Under
an arbitrary and capricious analysis, one could first look at
whether the stated goals of the NCAA necessitate the
enforcement of its rules.150 The goal of “retain[ing] a clear line
of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports”151 is the obvious thrust of many of these rules. At first
glance, the no-agent rule seems to correlate well with the
NCAA’s principle that “student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises.”152
After all, what universities and colleges would want agents
lurking about campus to solicit contract deals with elite college
athletes?
But the no-agent rule reaches deeper than that and regulates
the contractual activities of athletes before they even set foot on
campus.153 Further, the no-agent rule is not seemingly attempting
to disqualify prospective NCAA student-athletes who have
engaged in criminal or other morally repugnant activity prior to
playing sports for their college in a way that some university
147. See Rachel Blechman, Student Challenges to Academic Decisions (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Stetson University College of Law) (citing Sharick v. Se. U. of
Health Scis., Inc., 780 So.2d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)) (supporting the concept that
courts normally do not substitute their judgment for the professional judgment of academic
institutions, unless there is bad faith or an arbitrary or capricious judgment rendered by the
institution) [https://perma.cc/9H3Z-NUQH].
148. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at xii.
149. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188, n.85 (citing the doubts expressed in Mitten &
Davis, supra note 125, at 121, about success in challenging NCAA eligibility rules given
these challenges’ lack of success in the courts, but noting that article was written prior to the
Oliver decision).
150. See Busby, supra note 6, at 163 (quoting Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214
(Ohio C.P. Erie Cnty. 2009)) (stating that “the NCAA’s amateurism rules furthered an
‘unreliable (capricious) and illogical (arbitrary)’ purpose”).
151. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
152. Id. at Principle 2.9, at 4.
153. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 176-77.
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admissions departments might take issue to a prospective
student’s prior illegal drug use. Signing an agency agreement is
a completely legal action and a prudent one. It is merely the
athlete or parent exercising their right to contract a mutually
beneficial service.154
In terms of tennis, it is dubious at best, whether the no-agent
rule serves any of the NCAA’s stated purposes. First, one needs
to look no further than the exceptions the bylaws grant to tennis
for players’ acceptance of prize money at tournaments, both
before and while competing in intercollegiate tennis.155 While the
bylaws set limits on the prize amount that can be pocketed to
retain eligibility, this exception is an obvious accommodation to
the reality that collegiate-caliber tennis players in their mid-teens
are often entering and advancing in tournaments that hand out
cash prize money.156 The general formula is that if a tennis
player’s prize winnings do not exceed their expenses for the
tournaments they enter, their collegiate eligibility is preserved.157
This is in addition to the first $10,000 of prize money per year the
player can keep, unconditionally.158 While the expenses portion
of this equation cannot include anything other than the individual
player’s expenses, 159 such as expenses incurred by coaches or
parents, this is not a difficult criterion to meet. Most players
outside of the top 100 players in the world are not making more
money than they are spending, given the expense of travel,
lodging, and food at the various tournaments around the United
States and worldwide.160 Bottom line, it is a rare occasion where
a tennis player who has never cracked the world top 100 in
ranking would be deemed ineligible for collegiate play based on
this rule alone.161
The foregoing analysis illustrates how the no-agent rule fails
to even have a distant effect on the amateur status of a prospective
student-athlete tennis player. As previously mentioned, tennis
154. See Stross, supra note 6, at 189-90.
155. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2, at 66.
156. See id.; see also 2019 ITF MEN’S & WOMEN’S REGULATIONS, supra note 19, at
14, 52, 73, 117-18.
157. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2.1, at 66.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
161. See Waldstein, Thousands Play On, supra note 32.

2019

DOUBLE FAULT

583

players with the skills and talents to compete at either the
collegiate or professional level are competing in tournaments at a
young age.162 They do so to improve their skills enough to remain
competitive for collegiate scholarships, should they choose the
collegiate route, and to be able to compete against other
professionals, should they decide to forgo college. Indeed, the
tournaments themselves are good litmus tests for the tennis player
to determine whether they have the right stuff to compete in either
elite collegiate tennis or in the professional ranks. The players
are also winning cash-prize earnings in these tournaments,
depending on how far they advance.163 Bottom line, collegebound tennis players are playing for compensation, just like
professionals, prior to and while competing in intercollegiate
tennis. According to the NCAA bylaws, this professional activity
does not disqualify a tennis player from NCAA athletics so long
as the money earned is within the limits prescribed.164
To summarize, if as discussed above, the no-agent rule fails
to even indirectly address the purpose and achieve the results for
which the rule has been promulgated and enforced, then it is easy
to see how a court might conclude the rule is arbitrary and
capricious. In the Oliver case, Judge Tone opined, “Bylaw
12.3.2.1 is unreliable (capricious) and illogical (arbitrary) and
indeed stifles what attorneys are trained and retained to do.”165
Within the context of tennis, the foregoing analysis paints a strong
case for how the rule is unreliable and illogical in the NCAA’s
efforts preserve the amateur nature of collegiate athletics.
C. An Unconscionable Result?
The third-party beneficiary analysis can also lead us to a
discussion of contract unconscionability. That is, the prospective
tennis player who has violated the no-agent rule could make a
case that the no-agent rule, itself, yields unconscionable contract
results. A court would deem a contract unconscionable if it is so
one-sided that the unfairness to one of the parties is beyond what

162.
163.
164.
165.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, Bylaw 12.1.2.4.2, at 66.
Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
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the court would deem as fair dealing.166 There are two types of
unconscionability for contracts: procedural and substantive.167 A
court may find a contract is procedurally unconscionable when
there are such inequalities in age, maturity, or intelligence
between the contracting parties that it gives them vastly different
relative bargaining power.168 Substantive unconscionability
occurs when a court determines that the terms of the contract are
so overly harsh or one-sided that the most equitable remedy is not
to enforce it.169
In the case of the prospective NCAA student-athlete tennis
player, it would not be difficult to assert a claim of
unconscionability of both varieties. First, there is an agency
contract that the minor tennis player probably does not personally
sign, most likely does not understand, and in some cases, does not
even know about.170 Second, the parents have entered the
agreement with the best of intentions, hoping to help themselves
manage the advancement of their child’s tennis talent. Indeed,
the NCAA’s bylaws goal of preventing exploitation by
commercial interests could be the very reason the parents decide
to hire an agent.171 Finally, when the minor tennis player feels
their talents or life goals will be enriched and fulfilled by
attending college and playing NCAA tennis, the NCAA deems
that the existence of the agency relationship renders the player
166. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (Aᴍ. Lᴀᴡ. INST. & UNIF. Lᴀᴡ Cᴏᴍᴍ’ɴ 2017) (providing “(1)
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been
unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result. (2)
When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contractor any clause thereof may be
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination”).
The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-302 further clarify how a court would test for
unconscionability by stating: “The basic test is whether, in the light of the general
commercial background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses
involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the
time of the making of the contract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression
and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior
bargaining power.” Id. at cmt. 1 (citation omitted).
167. See M. Neil Browne & Lauren Biksacky, Unconscionability and the Contingent
Assumptions of Contract Theory, 2013 Mɪᴄʜ. Sᴛ. L. Rᴇᴠ. 211, 219 (2013).
168. See id. at 222-23.
169. See id. at 220-21.
170. Busby, supra note 6, at 139.
171. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Principle 2.9, at 4.
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disqualified from NCAA competition.172 To say that it is
procedurally unconscionable for the NCAA to penalize a
prospective collegiate athlete because of something they could
not control, or did not even know about, is not a farfetched
argument.
In light of the substantive unconscionability theory, it is also
not difficult to make the argument that such a contract’s terms are
overly harsh or oppressive.173 For this type of unconscionability,
the victims in this case are both the school and the athlete. For
the athlete, the revocation of the freedom to sign an agreement to
play sports at any NCAA institution is an overbroad penalty for a
prospective student-athlete who probably was not involved in the
agency contract. For the NCAA member school, the terms of
their contract with the NCAA prevent them from ever being able
to sign a student to play tennis at their institution after there was
much work done in recruitment and candidate file assessment to
conclude that the prospective NCAA student-athlete is the right
fit for their school.174
With the NCAA and member school contract so vulnerable
to a challenge under both unconscionable contract theories, it
would appear to be in the NCAA’s best interest to adjust the rule.
The unconscionability of the rule in grossly limiting the member
schools and the athlete also points to another contracting principle
that should give the NCAA pause about keeping the no-agent
rule: the liberty to contract.
D. No Liberty to Contract?
There is a basic constitutional law concept of freedom to
contract. The idea of liberty of contract evolved from the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First mentioned
in the Slaughter House cases, the Allgeyer et al. v. Louisiana case
concluded the following about the liberty to contract:
The “liberty” mentioned in that [Fourteenth]
amendment means, not only the right of the citizen to be free
172. Id. at Bylaw 12.3.1, at 71.
173. Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability: Applying the
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 946 (1986).
174. See Interview with Paul Peck, supra note 72; Navaroli, supra note 76.

586

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 72:3

from the mere physical restraint of his person, as by
incarceration, but the term is deemed to embrace the right of
the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to
be free to use them in all lawful ways; to live and work where
he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue
any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into
all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
above mentioned.175

This precedent and concept of the liberty to contract drew
much support in the years after this case, as the Supreme Court
struck down legislation that was thought to improperly impede an
individual’s or business’s freedom to contract.176
Denying a prospective tennis player the ability to sign a
commitment to play tennis at a NCAA regulated school because
of a previous agency agreement could also be said to encroach on
that player’s liberty to contract. The NCAA is restricting the
player’s ability to contract with the entire class of NCAA
regulated colleges and universities simply because of the previous
contractual agreement.177 It would be one thing if the NCAA’s
prohibition of contracting with a school was for a practical reason,
such as prohibiting a prospective NCAA student-athlete from
signing agreements to play at two or more schools. However, that
is not what the NCAA is trying to prevent with the no-agent rule;
consequently, the rule does not seem to have a practical or logical
result. That is, the NCAA is restricting the player’s ability to
contract simply because of an agreement they may not have even
personally signed when they were a minor.178
The survey of these four contract remedies for the
prospective tennis player deemed ineligible from NCAA
competition because of the no-agent rule admittedly reveal
various chances for success. On the one hand, the discussion of
potentially voiding an agency contract to undo the damage it did
to the potential NCAA career is a stretch, based on the reasons
discussed. The other three theories rely on a legal determination
that the prospective player is a third-party beneficiary of the
175. Allgeyer et al. v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897).
176. See John Raeburn Green, Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 27 WASH.
U. L. Q. 497, 507 (1942).
177. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
178. Busby, supra note 6, at 149-50.
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contract between the NCAA and its member schools, which has
been found to exist by the courts.179
There is reason to believe we have reached a tipping point
for the NCAA’s no-agent rule. The sum of the other three
possible legal remedies, coupled with courts’ lean towards
entertaining those theories, suggests an environment where the
no-agent rule will struggle to survive. As discussed in the next
section, courts are not only starting to find that prospective
collegiate tennis players do have legal relationships with the
NCAA in the realm of a third-party beneficiary, but at least one
of these court opinions also found that the no-agent rule is indeed
an arbitrary and capricious rule.180
IX. IN THE COURTS OF LAW: CLOSE TO AN
OVERRULE?
As discussed in some of the previous writings about NCAA
eligibility rules, there have been several relevant challenges of
those rules in the courts. Certain legal theories such as suggesting
the NCAA rules violate antitrust laws have largely been
fruitless.181 However, other challengers of the rules have at least
succeeded in getting the court to hear their cases that argue the
rules fail under the arbitrary and capricious theory.182 Those
judicial decisions have supported the notion that the prospective
student-athlete is a third-party beneficiary to the contract between
the NCAA and its member schools, thus giving the students the
requisite standing to even bring such a challenge. A survey of
these cases is instructive.
In Banks v. NCAA, a Notre Dame football player attempted
to reinstate his final year of collegiate eligibility after he had
entered the NFL draft.183 The theory of his case was that the
NCAA and its rules created an anticompetitive market in
violation of federal antitrust rules.184 In ruling for the NCAA, the
Court stated Banks failed to “allege an anti-competitive impact
179. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 188-89.
180. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
181. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1992).
182. Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d 203, 214 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009); Bloom v.
NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004).
183. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1083.
184. Id. at 1084.
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on a discernible market” and correspondingly dismissed Banks’s
claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.”185 The court ruling was quite supportive of the NCAA’s
commitment to amateurism and agreed the rules helped the
organization serve that purpose. They suggested that complete
abdication of even some of those rules—a potential had Banks
prevailed—”would turn amateur intercollegiate athletics into a
sham because the focus of college football would shift from
educating the student-athlete to creating a ‘minor league’ farm
system out of college football . . . .”186
Gaines v. NCAA, a similar antitrust challenge, was levied by
a Vanderbilt football recruit.187 Both Banks and Gaines sought
injunctive relief to prevent the NCAA from enforcing their rules,
at least for their unique circumstances.188 The Gaines court
similarly defended the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism and
held that Gaines would have to overcome an “especially heavy
burden” to convince the Court that injunctive relief could square
with the NCAA’s commitments.189 The Court ultimately held
that the NCAA bylaws were outside the reach of Sherman AntiTrust jurisdiction.190
The Banks and Gaines cases have two important distinctions
from the circumstances of our case studies, Maria Genovese and
Katerina Stewart. First, both football players knew at the time
that they were violating NCAA rules that would render them
ineligible to further compete in college football.191 Maria and
Katerina did not know, at the time, their actions would violate
NCAA eligibility rules. In fact, they were not even members of
an NCAA regulated organization at the time of their
infractions.192 Second, both cases involved athletes crossing the
professional line (entering the draft) which rendered them
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id. at 1094.
Id. at 1091.
Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1992); Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at

741.
189. Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 742.
190. Id. at 744-45.
191. See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1083-84; Gaines, 746 F.Supp. at 740.
192. See Lockhart, supra note 6, at 187 (noting that student-athletes are regulated by
some of the NCAA eligibility rules even before they are members of an NCAA regulated
institution and juxtaposing that concept against the fact that the NCAA enjoys great
deference from the courts in its status as a private organization).
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ineligible to return to collegiate play.193 For Maria, Katerina, and
other tennis players, this scenario plays out all the time in that precollegiate players often enter professional tournaments, whether
declaring or not, and the NCAA rules are amenable to such
activity.
Bloom v. NCAA and Oliver v. NCAA are relevant cases in
that they both entertained claims against NCAA eligibility rules
based on third-party standing theory.194 Bloom also involved a
football player who had not entered the professional ranks in
football, but had competed professionally in skiing, thus running
afoul of NCAA football eligibility for endorsement arrangements
while engaged in skiing.195 The Court ruled against Bloom in
finding that the NCAA rules rationally related to their legitimate
purpose of maintaining the demarcation between collegiate and
professional sports.196 However, the Court entertained his
argument after determining he had standing to challenge the
NCAA bylaws as a third-party beneficiary.197
The Oliver court also supported the third-party standing
claim and even ruled in favor of the NCAA rule challenger on the
merits of his argument.198 This case involved a baseball player
who was found ineligible for NCAA baseball competition
because he had his attorney present when negotiating a potential
contract with the Minnesota Twins Major League Baseball
organization.199 The NCAA does not have a per-se “no-attorney”
rule, but attorneys are still forbidden from attending these types
of negotiations.200 The Court ruled in favor of Oliver to the
delight of NCAA eligibility rule antagonists under the theory that
the rule was arbitrary and capricious and not rationally related to
the stated goals of preserving amateurism in intercollegiate
athletics.201 The Court found it quite paradoxical that in trying to
protect prospective student-athletes from exploitation, it forbids
193. See Banks, 977 F.2d at 1083-84; Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 740.
194. See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623-24 (Colo. App. 2004); Oliver v. NCAA,
920 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
195. Bloom, 93 P.3d at 622.
196. Id. at 626.
197. Id. at 623-24.
198. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 211-12.
199. Id. at 206-07.
200. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.3.2.1.
201. Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 215-16.
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them from having competent representation at the time the athlete
most needed it.202
While the Oliver case represented a monumental victory for
student-athletes challenging NCAA bylaws that appear to be
tangentially, at best, related to the goal of preserving amateurism,
the Court’s decision was ultimately vacated due to a settlement
between Oliver and the NCAA, which included lifting a court
injunction prohibiting the NCAA from enforcing the rule.203 Still,
the case gives some hope to those who have fallen victim to an
NCAA rule violation, such as the no-agent rule, because it is yet
another case that held the prospective NCAA student-athletes
have standing to challenge the rules, and it found that the
challenger prevailed on the merits of an arbitrary and capricious
claim.204
X. IN THE COURTS OF PUBLIC POLICY:
UNFORCED ERRORS
Before delving into the policy challenges of the NCAA noagent rule, a quick review of our case studies is in order.205 Maria
Genovese and Katerina Stewart were on-the-rise tennis stars
whose parents had entered agency agreements on their behalf.
The parents’ motives were completely benign, acting in the best
interests of their daughters. Both Maria and Katerina hit a
juncture in their careers where they decided to go to college and
compete at the NCAA level. Both had the skills to be a part of an
elite NCAA program. Neither knew at the time of their agency
agreement that they would end up pursuing collegiate tennis.
Maria’s pursuit was driven by the fact that injuries during her
junior tennis years impeded her development to be a consistent
winner at the professional level. Katerina wanted to both play
tennis and serve her country in the military; West Point was the
perfect fit. Neither knew that having signed the agency
agreement rendered them ineligible for collegiate competition
until they reached the life event of entering college. Maria lost

202.
203.
204.
205.

See id. at 214.
See Busby, supra note 6, at 163-64.
See Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 212, 215-16.
See supra Part IV.
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her appeals with the NCAA.206 Katerina withdrew from the U.S.
Military Academy Preparatory School when advised that her
appeal to the NCAA would be difficult to win.207 Maria simply
could not afford to enroll in college without some type of
scholarship. For Katerina, standing on the sidelines her entire
college career was too much to bear; her talents beckoned her
back on the tour of the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA)
where she is back to 282 in the world and playing in the minor
leagues again.208
B. Tennis Players and Their Agents: It’s All Part of the
Business!
This article does not intend to portray tennis agents as having
nefarious motives while preying upon young tennis players
simply trying to make some money off their talents. However, to
be sure, these agents are engaged in a business enterprise and will
seek out clients who they think have the potential to make money
in the professional ranks. It is in their best interests to enter into
agreements that will be mutually beneficial: the tennis player gets
the direction they need to advance their career while the agent
gets the payment and reputation of helping make it happen given
his good judgment and years of expertise.
Additionally, the agents are an extension of tennis coaches,
working on the player’s career issues and reallocating that time to
the coach in order to develop the player’s game.209 Indeed, the
lower ranked player’s paid coaches (and parents) are also their de
facto agents, and there is certainly no NCAA rule forbidding a
collegiate tennis recruit from having ever paid a coach in their
career.
Further, the agents are not obligated to warn the developing
tennis player that using their services will most likely disqualify
her from collegiate competition,210 and even if they did, the player
206. Telephone interview with Maria Genovese, supra note 53.
207. Interview with Katerina Stewart, supra note 72.
208. See Players: Katerina Stewart, ITF, [https://perma.cc/53XD-UVCM] (last visited
Nov. 6, 2019), for Katerina Stewart’s profile and current ranking.
209. Maryann Hudson & Elliott Almond, They Play by Their Own Rules: Colleges:
Sports Agents Are Everywhere, and the NCAA Estimates 70% of Current Athletes Have Had
Contact with Them, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 13, 1995), [https://perma.cc/6YR2-MNP8].
210. See REVISED UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015).
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is probably not focused on that eventuality. Thus, this Article is
not intended to paint the agents as the bad guys in these scenarios;
they certainly have interests, as do both parties in this equation.
This leads us to an examination of the prudence of the NCAA’s
no-agent policy and whether it is serving the NCAA, the agents,
or the players with the intent for which it was conceived.
C. Unforced Errors: Inconsistent Policy
The NCAA bylaw exceptions that accommodate
professional activity reveal that the NCAA does not consider
tournament play—some of which pits prospective college players
against seasoned professionals—and the prize money awarded at
tournaments to cross the line of demarcation between collegiate
and professional sports.211 The obvious question is then, how
would the prospective student-athlete’s (or their parent’s) hiring
of an agent cause that line to be crossed? For Maria Genovese or
Katerina Stewart, the prize money acceptance was not what
doomed their collegiate tennis career; the no-agent rule did.212
The hiring of an agent does not guarantee you have, or will attain,
the earnings required to harm your eligibility under the rule; in
some cases you may, in others you may not. Thus, we can
disassociate the NCAA no-agent rule from the NCAA limits on
the acceptance of the prize money.213 It is therefore logical that
the NCAA can retain or remove one rule without harming the
purpose of the other. In this situation, the recommendation would
be to eliminate the no-agent rule due to its lack of correlation with
the professional earnings exception of the NCAA bylaws.
D. Legal-Policy: Legal Headwinds Beg for Policy
Change
A key reason for recommending changes to the NCAA noagent rule is not just that it is misguided policy, but that it is so
fraught with potential legal challenges identified in this Article
that it seems only a matter of time before those legal disputes
persuade the NCAA to make accommodations. Even with the
211. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at Bylaw 12.1.2.4, at 66.
212. See id. at 63, 66, 71.
213. See id.
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typical deference yielded to the NCAA as a private organization,
the courts may end up granting relief from the no-agent rule on
an individual basis often enough for the NCAA to realize the
exceptions start swallowing up the rule. As discussed above, a
tennis player who previously signed, or whose parents signed, an
agency contract may find it difficult to retroactively disaffirm that
agreement and successfully doing so might not even make a
difference in terms of satisfying the NCAA rules.214 But with
strong arguments about the arbitrary and capricious and
potentially unconscionable nature of the no-agent rule, the NCAA
may find itself on the losing end of future challenges. The Oliver
case shows that the NCAA no-agent rule may already be on shaky
ground and is not immune from a court challenge.215
But even if the NCAA staves off legal challenges of its
bylaws in the future, the mere fact that the no-agent rule puts
prospective tennis players in these legal binds suggests that a
policy change would be prudent. Maria Genovese and Katerina
Stewart are not the last tennis talents to find themselves in a
position where they unwittingly sacrificed their collegiate
eligibility. For every player who enlisted the support of an agent,
there are others who decided to forgo the advice of an agent just
to preserve amateurism because they knew of the risks. Even if
the NCAA better educates and forewarns its prospective tennis
players that hiring an agent will render them ineligible for
collegiate competition, or even if every player were to read
Professor Porto’s article to become better informed, 216 does the
sport of tennis really want to foster that dynamic? Would it not
be better to allow tennis players or their parents to become better
informed by hiring an expert in the field rather than further
cultivating the often-unseen minefield of agency violations?
XI. MATCH POINT: PROPOSED CHANGES
Based on the legal and policy issues highlighted in this
Article, it is high time for the NCAA to remove the no-agent rule,
at least for the sport of tennis. Perhaps the arguments posed will
move the NCAA to remove the rule for other or all sports, but for
214. See DiMatteo, supra note 120, at 486-88; NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1.
215. See Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E. 2d 203, 214 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2009).
216. See generally Porto, supra note 89.
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now it is clear that the rule fails to serve the amateurism interests
of the NCAA, disadvantages rising stars in the tennis world, and
is fraught with potential legal and policy inconsistencies. At
minimum, the no-agent rule causes the NCAA to abdicate its
responsibility to engage in fair dealing with all parties with which
it enjoys a contractual relationship.217
Empathetic to the NCAA’s main goal of preserving
amateurism in intercollegiate sports,218 the no-agent rule should
still apply to tennis players for as long as they are enrolled in an
NCAA regulated institution. To allow otherwise would infest
colleges and university with agents trying to exploit the talents of
collegiate athletes. This would not serve the interests of the
member universities and would run directly counter to the
NCAA’s goals of avoiding such athlete exploitation. Indeed, it
would make a mockery of amateur intercollegiate athletics, and
collegiate tennis coaches would not want to tolerate such activity.
For tennis, however, allowing aspiring young tennis players
who are already competing in tournaments and winning money to
hire an agent will not cause the athlete from crossing some
imaginary line making them an irrevocable professional. The
NCAA should keep the current rules allowing for retention of
amateur status if the player’s tournament winnings do not exceed
actual expenses219—this is the true mark of whether a player is
engaged in the sport as a professional and would provide an
adequately clear demarcation line for whether an aspiring young
tennis player has crossed the line from amateur to professional.
Turning back to our case studies, Maria Genovese and
Katarina Stewart, the amateur nature of college tennis would not
have collapsed had they signed with their respective schools and
played NCAA tennis.220 At these universities, they would have
been playing with and against other women just like them: those
players that trained for tennis from a young age, played in junior
tournaments, trained at an elite tennis academy, and flirted with
the prospect of forgoing college to join the hard grind in the
professional ranks. These two players were unable to play NCAA
tennis because they had one thing different than their counterparts
217.
218.
219.
220.

See Oliver, 920 N.E. 2d at 212.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, Const. art. 1.3.1, at 1.
See id. at 63, 66.
See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 1, at 63, 66, 71.
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in college tennis: they had hired an agent or otherwise signed an
endorsement deal. If, as recommended, the no-agent rule
remained in place for their time at university, their schools would
not have turned into a feeding frenzy for agents seeking to pluck
them out of their college tennis environment and actively
marketing their skills while still competing as an amateur.
What is even more telling about their stories is what they are
doing now: Katerina Stewart is plodding away back in the tennis
minor leagues221 and Maria Genovese is competing in collegiate
tennis for a school not governed by NCAA rules.222 Katerina is
back with her original crowd of prospective collegiate and
professional tennis players223 and Maria is competing with
collegiate athletes.224 Both would still be eligible for NCAA
tennis at this point if were not for the no-agent rule.

221. Florida’s Katerina Stewart Wins USTA Pro Circuit Naples Title, USTA Fʟᴀ.
(May 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/D3JL-TWSP] [hereinafter Stewart Wins UTSA].
222. 2019-20 Women’s Tennis Roster, supra note 66.
223. See Stewart Wins UTSA, supra note 220.
224. 2019-20 Women’s Tennis Roster, supra note 66.

